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Abstract  
By distinguishing between prior intentions and intentions in action, Searle has helped solve a 
number of difficulties confronted by the earlier versions of the causal theory of actions. Yet 
this distinction also raises important new issues. In particular, once a distinction is posited 
between two types of intentions, one must specify what the exact nature of their respective 
contents is and explain how the two types of intentions are connected. I suggest that in 
addressing those issues we could benefit from the insights provided by recent work in the 
cognitive neuroscience of action. I try to show how this work can help us give a more precise 
characterization of the content of intentions in action and bridge the gap between prior 
intentions and intentions in action.  
 
   
   
1. Introduction  
Starting with Davidson's seminal paper "Actions, Reasons and Causes" (1963), the Causal 
Theory of Action has been a popular approach to understanding both the nature of actions and 
the explanation of actions. Numerous versions of the Causal theory have been offered and 
although I doubt any of them is at present perfectly satisfactory, I believe this general 
approach to be on the right track. According to Bach (1978: 361-362), to be adequate a theory 
of action should do justice to the following facts: (1) that explanation of action is causal 
explanation (in particular, a reason does not explain an action unless it is also a cause of the 
action); (2) that behaviour counting as action is distinguished partly by how it is brought 
about and partly by how it is experienced by an agent; and (3) that some actions (routine, 
automatic, impulsive actions) are not deliberate or preceded by any conscious intention to 
perform them.2 [401] I agree with Bach that these are obvious conditions of adequacy that a 
theory of action should meet and, twenty years later, I share his view that the causal approach 
is the most promising.  
Obviously, the earlier versions of the causal theory failed to meet some of the constraints 
spelled out by Bach. In particular, they largely neglected the phenomenological aspects of 
action and they failed to offer a satisfactory account of non-deliberate actions. Moreover, they 
confronted the well-known problem of causal deviance. Yet, I think, the introduction by 
Searle (1983) of the distinction between prior intentions and intentions in action (and by other 
                                                 
1 Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the First French-Italian Meeting of Analytic Philosophy in Padova 
(1997), at a Symposium on Neuroscience and Philosophy of Action, organised by the Collège de France and the 
Academia  Europaea in Paris (1997), at the ESPP Conference in Lisbon (1998), and at CREA in Paris (1999). I 
would like to thank these various audiences for their comments. Special thanks to José Bermudez, Jérôme Dokic, 
Pierre Jacob, Pierre Livet, Michele di Francesco, Jo'lle Proust and two anonymous referees for this journal for 
comments on earlier drafts. 
2 For instance, Brand (1984) draws a distinction between immediate and prospective intentions, Mele (1992) 
between proximal and distal intentions, Bratman (1987) between present-directed and future-directed intentions, 
and Bach (1978) between intentions and executive representations. Although they are not strictly equivalent to it, 
these distinctions present similarities with Searle's distinction. Indeed, Brand's and Bach's distinctions are very 
close to Searle's at least in the respects that will interest me in this paper. Although I shall be using Searle's 
terminology, which is perhaps more familiar, and discussing his account, much of what I'll say applies as well to 
Brand's and Bach's accounts. 
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philosophers of similar distinctions3) has helped solve a number of those difficulties 
confronted by the earlier versions of the Causal Theory of Actions.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a defence of the conditions of adequacy set forth 
by Bach or to argue in favour of the causal approach. This general framework is then simply 
presupposed. My aim here is much more specific. Despite its usefulness, the Searlian 
distinction seems to me to raise problems of its own. The exact nature of the respective 
contents of two types of intentions as well as the nature of the relationship between these 
contents remain in need of further clarification. On the one hand, although it may be supposed 
that the content of intentions in action is a type of non-conceptual content, we still need an 
account of the exact nature of this content, i.e., an account of what is encoded and of how 
what is encoded can play a causal role in the production of behaviour. In particular, we need 
to examine whether, as Searle contends, the content of intentions in action includes a causally 
self-referential component, and how this component could be non-conceptually represented. 
On the other hand, although prior intentions are presumably conscious states with conceptual 
content, it remains unclear what makes an organism capable of forming conscious prior 
intentions, what is involved in the mastery of action concepts and how action concepts are 
related to the non-conceptual content of intentions in action.  
In this paper, I would like to suggest that in our attempts to confront those issues, we could 
benefit from considering recent work in the neurophysiology of action, in particular work on 
motor intentions and motor imagery. In what follows, I first give a brief sketch of how the 
distinction between prior intentions and intentions in action has helped solve certain 
difficulties faced by the Causal Theory of Action. I'll then try to show how 
neurophysiological work on motor intentions and motor imagery can help us give a more 
precise [402] account both of the content of intentions in action and of the relationship 
between intentions in action and prior intentions. Insofar, as this account appears satisfactory, 
it may constitute an indirect argument in favour of the Searlian distinction, and, more 
generally, of the causal approach. 
  
2. Classical Versions of the Causal Theory and their Difficulties  
According to the classical versions of the Causal Theory of Actions,4 what distinguishes 
actions from mere happenings is the nature of their causal antecedents. Genuine actions are 
events with a distinctive mental cause. More precisely, according to Brand's formulation of 
the Causal Theory, "[a subject] S's Aing is an action iff there is a [mental event] M of S such 
that (i) M caused S's Aing and (ii) M is appropriate to S's Aing" (1984, p. 7). The relevant 
causal antecedent is typically conceived as a complex of some of the subjects' beliefs and 
desires. According to Davidson (1963), for instance, the causal antecedent of an action is a 
combination of a pro-attitude toward actions of a certain kind and a belief that that kind of 
action can be performed. Clause (ii) says that the content of the mental event relates to the 
performance of an action. Assuming that A is the action and that the relevant mental event is a 
                                                 
3 For instance, Brand (1984) draws a distinction between immediate and prospective intentions, Mele (1992) 
between proximal and distal intentions, Bratman (1987) between present-directed and future-directed intentions, 
and Bach (1978) between intentions and executive representations. Although they are not strictly equivalent to it, 
these distinctions present similarities with Searle's distinction. Indeed, Brand's and Bach's distinctions are very 
close to Searle's at least in the respects that will interest me in this paper. Although I shall be using Searle's 
terminology, which is perhaps more familiar, and discussing his account, much of what I'll say applies as well to 
Brand's and Bach's accounts. 
4 The most prominent proponents of the Causal Theory are Davidson (1963, 1973, 1978) and Goldman (1970). 
The origin of the current interest in the Causal Theory can be traced back to Davidson's 1963 paper 'Actions, 
Reasons and Causes'. Versions of the Causal Theory have also been advocated by Sellars (1966, 1973), 
Castañeda (1975, 1980), Searle (1979, 1983), and Brand (1984). 
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combination of a belief and a desire, this means that the desire should be a desire that one As 
and the belief a belief that one can do so.  
However, this simple version of the Causal Theory is faced with several difficulties. First, as a 
number of philosophers (Brand 1984; Davis 1979; Searle 1983) have remarked, many actions, 
in particular automatic ones, do not seem to be preceded by any intention to perform them, at 
least if the intention (i.e. on the Causal Theory the belief-desire pair) is meant to be conscious 
or introspectively available. To borrow an example from Searle (1983), suppose I am sitting 
in a chair reflecting on a philosophical problem, and I suddenly get up and start pacing about 
the room; although my getting up and pacing about are actions of mine, in order to do them I 
do not need to form an intention to do them prior to doing them.  
Second, the Causal Theory faces the problem of causal deviance or waywardness. To borrow 
an example from Davidson (1973), a climber might want to rid himself of the weight and 
danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the 
rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve 
him as to cause him to loosen his hold. Yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen 
his hold, nor did he do it intentionally. The problem here is that not [403] every causal 
relation between seemingly appropriate mental antecedents and resultant events qualifies the 
latter as actions. The challenge then is to specify the causal connection that must hold 
between the antecedent mental event and the resultant behaviour for the latter to qualify as an 
action.  
Finally, a third objection to the Causal Theory is that it fails to account for the specific 
features of our knowledge of our own actions (Frankfurt, 1978; Wakefield and Dreyfus, 
1991). Since the Causal Theory claims that the main difference between actions and simple 
events lies in their causal antecedents, it implies that actions and simple events are not 
intrinsically different. Or to put it otherwise, as far as the account goes, the phenomenology of 
bodily motion could be exactly the same in bodily movements that are caused by intentions 
and thus qualify as actions and in bodily movements that are not actions, such as Penfied 
motions caused by electrode firings in the motor cortex (Penfield, 1975). As a consequence, 
the theory must assume that an agent knows that she is performing an action not in virtue of 
her immediate awareness that she is moving, but because she knows what the antecedent 
conditions causing her behaviour are. Thus, the Causal Theory cannot envisage, as a criterion 
of action, that the agent may stand in a specific relation to her bodily movements during the 
time when she is presumed to be acting.  
 
3. Searle's Dual Theory of Intentions  
In order to answer those problems, Searle (1983) proposed that we distinguish between two 
types of intentions, what he calls intentions in action and prior intentions. In Searle's 
terminology, a 'prior intention' corresponds to the initial representation of the goal of the 
action prior to the initiation of the action. However, on Searle's account it is not enough that a 
bodily motion be caused by a prior intention in order for it to qualify as an action. It is 
moreover required that the bodily motion be caused by an intention in action, that proximately 
causes the physiological chain leading to overt behaviour. The label 'intention in action' is 
indeed quite appropriate in that it highlights an important aspect of this conception of the 
causation of action, namely that the intention does not terminate with the onset of action but 
continues until the action is completed. On this view, the intention does not simply trigger the 
action, it plays a continuing causal role in shaping the action, guiding and monitoring it until 
completion.  
Let us examine how this proposal can help solve the difficulties mentioned earlier. To begin 
with, it provides a straightforward answer to the first problem we pointed out (that many 
actions do not seem to be preceded by any conscious intention to perform them). According to 
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the revised Causal Theory, all actions have intentions in action, but they do not all have prior 
intentions. Moreover, although intentions in action can be conscious, that is accompanied by 
what Searle (1983) calls an 'experience of acting', this needs not be the case. Thus, on the 
modified causal account, for a bit of behaviour to qualify as an [404] action, it is both 
necessary and sufficient that it be caused by an intention in action, and it does not matter 
whether the latter is accompanied by an experience of acting or not. The modified Causal 
Theory also provides at least a partial answer to the problem of causal deviance or 
waywardness. On this view, what is criterial for an event to qualify as an action is not that it 
be caused by a prior intention, but that it be caused by an intention in action. Thus, in 
Davidson's example, the climber's loosening his hold does not count as an action despite its 
being caused by a prior intention to do so,5 because the intervening events in the causal chain 
that links the prior intention to the resultant bodily behaviour do not include an intention in 
action that one performs that bodily movement. However, for a complete answer to the 
problem of causal deviance to be provided, more needs to be said. In cases where the agent is 
acting on his prior intention, there must be a close connection between the prior intention and 
the intention in action and we need to spell out what this connection is.  
The revised Causal Theory also seems to answer the third objection concerning our 
knowledge of our own actions. Insofar as the intention in action is involved in the guidance 
and monitoring of the action, it does not terminate with the onset of action, but continues as 
long as the guidance and monitoring continues. As a consequence, it seems possible to 
reconciliate the view that the main difference between actions and simple events lies in their 
causal antecedents with the idea that we are immediately aware that we are acting and that 
this awareness has a non-perceptual source. According to the Searlian account, this awareness 
takes the form of an experience of acting, that is a conscious presentation of the intentional 
content of the intention in action. More precisely, what makes it the case that this conscious 
presentation of the content of the intention in action is an experience of acting (rather than an 
experience of a bodily motion that may or may not be an action) is the fact that the content of 
intentions in action includes a causally self-referential component. In other words, it is part of 
the content of an intention in action that this intention in action causes certain bodily motions. 
Thus, the experience of acting contains within it the experience that the bodily motion is 
being caused by the intention in action. I shall say more presently about the causal self-
referentiality of intentions.6 
[405] Prima facie, then, the Searlian account seems more promising than the standard 
Davidsonian account. Via the concept of the intention in action, Searle seems able to provide 
solutions to problems encountered by the standard account. Yet, the Searlian account poses 
problems of its own. For once a distinction is posited between two types of intentions, one 
must answer the question how they are connected. And before one tries to answer this 
question, one must have a precise characterization of each type of intention. So let's see first 
what are the characterizations Searle offers and second what further elaborations may to be 
needed and how they might be provided.  
 
                                                 
5 Actually, unless it is assumed that prior intentions reduce to belief-desire pairs, one can even deny that in the 
climber's case a prior intention is present. 
6 As Searle insists, this awareness of acting should not be confused with the perceptual awareness 
(proprioceptive or otherwise) of our bodily movements. There can be an experience of acting without there being 
actual bodily movements, as in the famous case described by William James (1950) where a patient with an 
anaesthetised arm is asked to close his eyes and then to raise his arm. Unknown to him his arm is held to prevent 
it from moving and when he opens his eyes, he is surprised to discover that there was no arm movement. 
Conversely, a patient can be caused to move his hand by applying an electrode to the motor cortex of one 
hemisphere (Penfield, 1975), in which case the patients feels his arm moving but reports no experience of acting. 
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4. The Searlian Characterization of Intentions in Action and Prior Intentions  
Searle characterizes both intentions in action and prior intentions in terms of their intentional 
content, as given by their conditions of satisfaction, where the expression 'conditions of 
satisfaction' makes reference to the requirements that have to be met, and not to the things that 
meet those requirements. The characterization he offers is the following:  
[...] the contents of the prior intention and the intention in action look quite different, 
because, though both are causally self-referential, the prior intention represents the 
whole action as the rest of its conditions of satisfaction, but the intention in action 
presents, but does not represent, the physical movement and not the whole action as 
the rest of its conditions of satisfaction. In the former case the whole action is the 
'Intentional object'; in the latter case the movement is the 'Intentional object'. [...] 
Another difference is that in any real-life situation the intention in action will be much 
more determinate than the prior intention. (1983, p. 93) 
Let us examine each of these points in turn. Searle first notes that both prior intentions and 
intentions in action are causally self-referential: that is, their conditions of satisfaction require 
that the intentional states themselves play a causal role in bringing about the rest of their 
conditions of satisfaction. Causal self-referentiality is a feature intentions share with 
perceptions, although in the case of perception the direction of causation is reversed. Searle 
draws a distinction between features of content which function to determine conditions of 
satisfaction and features outside the content which also serve to fix the conditions of 
satisfaction. He is quite explicit, however, in claiming that the causal self-referentiality 
belongs with the conditions of satisfaction that are internal to content. A number of 
philosophers (Armstrong, 1991, Burge, 1991, McDowell, 1991) have objected to this analysis 
of the causal self-referentiality of perceptions and intentions. Although they agree that Searle 
is right to include causal self-referentiality as part of the conditions of satisfaction of those 
[406] states, they think that by making this condition of satisfaction internal to the intentional 
content, he attributes too complicated or too sophisticated an intentional content to visual 
experiences and experiences of acting. Searle's reply to this objection appeals to a distinction 
between what is represented and how what is represented is represented. A misunderstanding 
arises, according to Searle, because his critics take the theoretical specifications he offers of 
the content of intentions or perceptions as specifications both of what is represented and how 
it is represented. But the mode of presentation of the conditions of satisfaction of an intention 
in a theoretical exposition of the intentional content of intentions is a second-order 
characterization and need not be (and presumably is not) the mode of presentation under 
which the conditions of satisfaction are represented in the intentional content of an intention. 
As Searle puts it: "An agent may have a conscious Intentional content and that Intentional 
content may determine the conditions of satisfaction under certain aspects, that is with a 
certain 'mode of presentation', where the agent may not himself have a second-order 
awareness of how the conscious Intentional content functions to determine the conditions of 
satisfaction under those aspects" (1991: 231). Applied to the case of self-referentiality, this 
means that from the fact that the causal self-referentiality is a feature of the intentional content 
of intentions, it does not follow that the agent has to have the concept of causal self-
referentiality, second-order or demonstrative references to his intentions, or thoughts about 
causation in order to have intentions. Searle is certainly right to claim that we should 
distinguish between a second-order representation of the conditions of satisfaction offered in a 
theoretical analysis and the first-order representational facts. However, his case for making 
causal self-referentiality a condition of satisfaction internal to content rather than simply 
external would be made more convincing if he could provide a (second-order) 
characterization of the mode of presentation of the intended bodily movement that makes 
clear how this causal self-referentiality can be part of this mode of presentation. In what 
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follows I shall offer a tentative characterization of the mode of presentation of actions in 
intentions in action. We will then be in a position to examine whether, given this 
characterization, Searle's contention can be sustained. But first let us pursue with the 
characterization of intentions in action and prior intentions.  
Searle points out three differences between intentions in action and prior intentions. The first 
difference concerns the rest of their conditions of satisfaction. Searle claims that whereas the 
content of intentions in action presents physical movements, the content of prior intentions 
represents whole actions, that is, not just a physical movement, but the causal sequence 
consisting of the intention in action causing the physical movement. Thus, to borrow one of 
his examples, the conditions of satisfaction of my prior intention to raise my arm can be 
expressed as follows:  
An intention in action which is a presentation of my arm going up causes my arm to 
go up as a result of this prior intention 
[407] By contrast, the condition of satisfaction of the intention in action is simply that:  
           My arm goes up as a result of this intention in action  
The second difference between prior intentions and intentions in action is that the former 
represent their conditions of satisfaction whereas the latter present them. Searle first 
introduces the distinction between presentations and representations in a discussion of 
perceptual intentionality, in order to mark a contrast between the ways in which perceptual 
experiences and beliefs are related to their objects. Perceptual experience is said to provide a 
direct access to its object. As Searle puts it, 'The experience has a kind of directness, 
immediacy and involuntariness which is not shared by a belief I might have about the object 
in its absence. It seems therefore unnatural to describe visual experiences as representations' 
(1983, p. 46). Searle later draws an analogy between perception and action, claiming that the 
formal relations between the visual memory of a flower, the visual experience of the flower, 
and the flower are the mirror images of the relations between the prior intention to raise my 
arm, the intention in action of raising my arm and my arm rising. In particular, the prior 
intention (representation) is to the intention-in action (presentation) as the perceptual memory 
(representation) is to the perceptual experience (presentation).  
Finally, Searle points out that the content of an intention of action is much more determinate 
than the content of a prior intention, meaning that my intention in action to raise my arm, for 
instance, will include not only that my arm goes up, but that it goes up in a certain way, at a 
certain speed, etc. Although he does not expand on this point, I think it is essential. Indeed, 
what is at stake is not merely a difference in the degree of determinacy insofar as such a 
difference could be cancelled by spelling out the prior intention in more detail; rather, it is a 
difference in the representational mode used to specify the content. The content of a prior 
intention contains a description of a type of action. It is a kind of conceptual content. By 
contrast, the content of the intention in action is a kind of non-conceptual content.7 I could 
raise my arm slowly or rapidly, I could raise my arm by first raising my hand, then my 
forearm and then my arm or I could run this sequence in the reverse [408] order. Different 
intentions in action would have to cause these movements, but they would all satisfy the 
description 'my raising my arm'. In order to make this point clearer, we can draw the analogy 
between perception and action in a way slightly different from Searle's, saying that the prior 
                                                 
7 It is important to note that although the non-conceptual nature of the content of intentions in action can be 
inferred from the characterization Searle offers of this content, Searle never explicitely makes this claim. Of 
course, the phrase 'non-conceptual content' has only recently gained wide currency. Although he does not use 
this phrase either, Bach (1978), whose distinction between intentions and executive representations is roughly 
similar to Searle's distinction between prior intentions and intentions in action, is more explicit then Searle in his 
characterization of executive representations. He claims that they are not propositional in form, that they are not 
linguistic or discursive in character, but intuitive or sensuous. He also contends that they lack the 
conceptualization involved in intentions. 
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intention is to the intention in action as the perceptual belief (rather than the perceptual 
memory) is to the perceptual experience. To adapt an example from Peacocke (1992), if you 
are looking at a range of mountains, you may form the perceptual belief that some are 
rounded, some are jagged. But the content of your visual experience in respect to the shape of 
the mountains is far more specific than that description suggests. The perceptual belief 
involving the concepts round and jagged would cover many different fine-grained contents 
that your experience could have. Similarly, my prior intention to raise my arm, where the 
action concept raising one's arm is a component of the content of the prior intention covers 
many fine-grained contents that the corresponding intention in action could have. And 
although we could use very fine-grained concepts to try to capture the fine-grained content of 
the intention in action, this does not entail that these concepts themselves are somehow 
components of the content of the intention in action nor that the concepts must be possessed 
by the agent for him to perform the intention in action. Otherwise, we would have to deny that 
young children or non-human animals who presumably lack concepts are capable of action. 
Moreover, as we have already seen in our discussion of self-referentiality, we have reasons to 
think that if there is a self-referential component of the content, this component is represented 
in a non-conceptual way.  
If the present characterization of intentions in action and prior intentions, based on Searle's 
analysis, is on the right track, the fact that an organism be capable of acting and thus that it 
have intentions in action is no warranty that it be capable of forming conscious prior 
intentions. The content of the prior intention represents the whole action, that is, it involves 
both a representation of the intention in action and a description of the physical movements 
that this intention in action is to cause -- i. e. a representation of the content of the intention of 
action. Moreover, whereas the (re)presentational content of the intention in action is a non-
conceptual kind of content, its description at the level of the prior intention makes use of 
action concepts. Thus, for an organism to be able to form prior intentions, it is moreover 
required that it have some conscious grasp of what an intention in action is and that it possess 
action concepts. As a consequence, our Searle-based account of the formal relationships 
between prior intentions and intentions in action needs to be supplemented in at least three 
ways. First, we need an account of the non-conceptual content of intentions in action that 
makes clear exactly what it could mean to say that causal self-referentiality is internal to this 
content. Second, we need an explanation of what makes it possible for an organism to have a 
conscious grasp of its intentions in action and of their role in bringing about actions. [409] 
Third, we need an explanation of how action concepts are related to the non-conceptual 
content of intentions in action.  
5. Motor Representations and the Non-Conceptual Content of Intentions in Action  
It seems that in our attempts to confront those issues, we could benefit from the insights 
provided by recent work in the neurophysiology of action. In a very stimulating synthesis of 
an important body of neurophysiological studies on the nature of motor intention and 
imagery, Jeannerod (1994a, 1997) provides evidence in favour of the following four theses:  
(1) Actions are driven by an internally represented goal rather than directly by the 
external world.  
(2) Motor representations have a specific content, involving two main aspects: a 
representation of the body in action as a generator of forces and a representation of a 
goal of action encoded in a 'pragmatic' mode, distinct from 'semantic' modes of 
representation.  
(3) There exists a close functional equivalence between motor preparation and motor 
imagery. In particular, the motor representations used in first-person motor imagery 
can be viewed  modulo certain qualifications  as the conscious counterparts of the 
representations constructed during motor preparation.  
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(4) The motor representations activated during motor preparation for (and motor 
imagery of) a specific action are also activated when the subject observes someone 
else performing the same action. 
The first thesis emphasizes a central version of the motor theory insofar as motor intentions 
are thought to be largely endogenous rather than generated by peripheral mechanisms 
propagating to central levels. This is not to deny that motor representations can rely, at least in 
part, on knowledge that is the result of our experience of the outside world, but it is to claim 
that there is no direct transformation of perceptual input into outgoing activity. A 
representational step intervenes that must involve the two components stated in thesis (2).  
The second thesis is of immediate relevance to the first problem at hand: providing a 
characterization of the non-conceptual content of intentions in action. The reason for equating 
Searle's intentions in action with Jeannerod's motor representations is that they are assigned 
the same function in both models, i. e. they are the proximal causes of actions and they play a 
continuing causal role in shaping the action, guiding and monitoring it until completion. The 
thesis picks out two complementary aspects of the content of motor representations. The first 
concerns the representation of the body in action. Jeannerod points out that the motor 
representation is a representation of the acting [410] self that involves a representation of the 
body as a generator of acting forces, not just a representation of the effects of those forces on 
the external world. Experimental studies reviewed by Jeannerod (Decety et al. 1993; 
Gandevia 1982, 1987; Gandevia and McCloskey, 1977; McCloskey et al. 1983) suggest that 
the amount of force needed to produce the desired motor effect is encoded in this component 
of the representation. Moreover, experiments with completely, or partially, paralysed patients 
(Gandevia 1982; Jeannerod 1994b; Scheerer 1987) suggest that the programming of force has 
a subjective correlate -- the sensation of effort. Empirical evidence also suggests that the 
central representation of action encodes certain parameters of movement execution dictated 
by kinematic rules (Decety and Michel 1989; Georgopoulos and Massey 1987; Georgopoulos 
et al. 1989; Viviani and McCollum 1983) and biomechanical constraints (Rosenbaum et al. 
1990; Rosenbaum and Jorgensen 1992; Shiffrar and Freyd 1990).  
The second essential aspect of a motor representation is a representation of the goal of action. 
In accordance with the 'schema' theory of action, Jeannerod develops the idea that this goal-
related component of the motor representation includes a representation of both the external 
object toward which it is directed, and the final state of the organism when that object has 
been reached. In simple, object-oriented actions (i. e., when objects are goals for actions), the 
visual attributes of those objects are represented in a specific, pragmatic mode used for the 
selection of appropriate movements and distinct from other modes of representation used for 
other aspects of object-oriented behaviour (categorization, recognition, etc.). Jeannerod's 
distinction between pragmatic and semantic modes of visual processing has its roots in 
Ungerleider and Mishkin's (1982) distinction between 'what' and 'where' systems of visual 
information processing, involved in the processing of object perception and in the processing 
of spatial analysis, respectively. According to the classical formulation of the distinction, the 
'where' system, corresponding to the cortical dorsal pathway, handles the processing of all 
visuospatial information, whether coded in viewer-centred coordinates or not, whereas the 
'what' system corresponding to the ventral cortical pathway is specialized in the processing of 
information concerning object identification -- thus enabling recognition and individuation -- 
and codes this information in object-centred coordinates.  
Jeannerod accepts the idea of a 'what' system, responsible for what he calls the semantic mode 
of object representation and corresponding to the ventral cortical pathway where objects are 
described in object-centred coordinates. His notion of pragmatic processing, however, does 
not correspond to the 'where' system, as traditionally construed. First, Jeannerod contends that 
the motor representation includes much more than the spatial aspects of the movements. He 
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draws a distinction between spatially oriented actions (like reaching), which are coded in 
viewer-centred coordinates, and object-oriented actions (like grasping and manipulating), 
which, in his view, involve a [411] representation of the shape of the object using an object-
centred system of coordinates. Given the tight coordination between the different arm 
segments involved in reaching and in grasping, it follows, according to Jeannerod, that an 
essential aspect of object-oriented behaviour is that the same object has to be simultaneously 
represented in multiple ways. Second, he contends that recent neurological data point to a 
division of labour between the ventral and dorsal pathways that differs from what was initially 
suggested by Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982). Thus, Goodale et al. (1991) reported the case 
of a patient whose lesion was likely to have interrupted the ventral pathway. Although the 
patient was unable to recognize objects, she was quite accurate when instructed to take these 
target objects. She was able not only to reach the object location, but she also preshaped her 
hand accurately according to the object's size and shape.8 By contrast, lesions in the dorsal 
pathway do not alter object recognition but they alter arm movement during reaching as well 
as finger movements during preshaping and grasping (Perenin and Vighetto 1988; Jeannerod 
1986; Jakobson et al. 1991). According to Jeannerod, the existence of such double 
dissociations confirms the hypothesis of selective semantic and pragmatic representation 
mechanisms and suggests that the dorsal pathway is involved not only in spatial processing 
but also in pragmatic processing. Thus, whereas Jeannerod's notion of semantic processing 
corresponds to the 'what' system, his system for pragmatic processing is not equivalent to the 
'where' system. Rather it constitutes a third kind of information processing, which could be 
called a 'how' system. Pragmatic representations differ from 'where' representations narrowly 
conceived insofar as (i) they encode not only information about object location, but also 
information about object attributes and (ii) they encode this latter kind of information in 
object-centred coordinates. They differ from 'what' or semantic representations in that (i) they 
are mainly processed in the dorsal pathway rather than in the ventral pathway, and (ii) they 
provide information for visually guided action rather than for visual identification.9 Yet, it 
should be noted that this dichotomous distinction between two visual systems, one dedicated 
to action and the other to perception, is an oversimplification that bears qualification. As 
pointed by Milner and Goodale (1995) and Jeannerod (1997) the anatomical and 
physiological organization of the two systems does not fully support the conception of a 
separate functioning. Moreover, the capacity to perform an appropriate object-oriented action 
may depend on information processed by the semantic system. [412] For instance, in order to 
pick a red apple among green ones, the pragmatic system must have access to information 
about colour processed by the ventral system. This indicates that the two systems are not fully 
separate but rather complementary. Thus, although the ventral system is mainly responsible 
for the construction of semantic representations and the dorsal system for the construction of 
pragmatic representation, it may be better not to make the distinction between semantic and 
pragmatic representations strictly dependent on this anatomical dichotomy.  
In order to get clearer as to what exactly is meant by pragmatic representations, one can 
appeal to Campbell's notion of causal indexicality (Campbell 1993, 1994). Campbell points 
out that many notions are causally significant insofar as judgements made using them have 
some significance for the ways in which the world will behave, and for how it would behave 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, this patient was later found by Dijkerman and Milner (1997) to be able to exploit motor imagery 
to help her remedy her impoverished visual perception. She could copy drawings of lines as if she could perceive 
them, provided she was given time to construct a mental image of herself tracing over them; if not given this 
opportunity, her drawings were random. Yet, she had no perceptual experience of the lines. 
9 It should be noted that Milner and Goodale (1993) proposed an account of the two visual processing systems 
very similar to Jeannerod, though different in detail. This account was further elaborated in Milner and Goodale 
(1995) and Milner (1997). 
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in various possible circumstances. A subclass of those notions has the further characteristic 
that grasp of their causal significance consists in one's practical grasp of their immediate 
implications for one's own actions. Notions in this subclass are what Campbell calls causally 
indexical notions. Predicates such as 'is a weight I can easily lift', 'is too hot for me to handle' 
or 'is within my reach' are offered by Campbell as examples of causally indexical predicates.10 
He notes, however, that although these examples make use of the first person and use notions 
of weight and temperature, use of indexical terms need not depend upon self-consciousness or 
grasp of non-indexical notions. Thus, unstructured uses of 'is heavy', 'is hot' or 'is within reach' 
may be taken as more primitive examples of causally indexical terms insofar as they have 
immediate implications for the subject's actions. Campbell's notion of causal indexicality fits 
nicely with Jeannerod's idea of a pragmatic mode of representation of objects and I think it 
would not be betraying Jeannerod's position to say that pragmatic representations of objects 
are causally indexical representations, where object attributes are treated in terms of their 
immediate implications for action, that is to the extent to which they afford specific motor 
patterns. Thus, Jeannerod's claim that a large number of object attributes (shape, size, 
compliance, texture, and so on) are relevant to both pragmatic and semantic representations, 
could be rephrased using Campbell's terminology by saying that those attributes can be 
represented in either a causally indexical or in a non-indexical way. For instance, the same 
shape could be represented as 'an elongated rectangle' (semantic mode) or as 'graspable with 
thumb and forefinger' (pragmatic mode).  
[413] To sum up, Jeannerod suggests that a motor representation of a goal object includes 
both a visuo-spatial component pertaining to its spatial location and an object-centred 
component determining how to deal with it. He also suggests that the function of those 
representations 'falls between' a sensory function (extracting from the environment attributes 
of objects or situations relevant to a given action) and a motor one (encoding certain aspects 
of that action). In other words, in a pragmatic representation, object attributes are treated in a 
causally indexical way, or, to use a different terminology, as 'affordances' (Gibson 1979), 
activating predetermined motor patterns.  
Jeannerod suggests that the same general framework used for simple object-oriented actions 
remains applicable to higher-order representations encoding long-term action plans. The 
lower-level object-oriented motor representations should be considered as constituents of 
more complex action representations, that will also need to involve higher-order schemas for 
controlling the selection, the activation, the inhibition, and the sequencing of elementary 
motor schemas.  
Although for expository purposes I distinguished between two aspects of the content of motor 
representations, it would be mistaken to assume that they correspond to two separate 
components of the content. Rather, motor representations as conceived of by Jeannerod 
should be viewed as relational models, with the body and the goal functioning as the terms of 
the relation. What the motor representation represents are neither states of the body per se nor 
states of the environment per se, but rather dynamic relations between body and goal. As an 
other way to put it, we could say that the goal is given under a specific mode of presentation, 
namely the form of a process.  
                                                 
10 The case of weight provides an illustration of the fact that not all the visual processing that might be subsumed 
as 'causally indexical' in Campbell's terms or 'pragmatic' in Jeannerod's is linked to the dorsal pathway. Certain 
visual illusions deceive our perceptual experience of size (ventral stream) without affecting our visuomotor 
control of finger opening, suggesting that the dorsal stream is not vulnerable to them (Goodale and Haffenden, 
1998). Yet these illusions do affect our grip force, presumably because the illusion causes us to misjudge their 
weight (Brenner and Smeets, 1996). Thus, properties such as 'too heavy to lift' probably depend on processing in 
the ventral stream. 
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There is yet a second, different sense, in which the mode of presentation of the content of 
intentions in action is relational and dynamical. Motor representations include perceptual11 
information both about the external world (e.g. the position in space and the shape of the 
object-goal) and about the agent's body (e.g. kinaesthetic and proprioceptive information 
about the position of the limbs). Insofar as motor representations include perceptual 
representations, they include non-descriptive modes of presentation. Here non-descriptiveness 
should be taken in both of the two senses distinguished by Recanati (1993). First, the mode of 
presentation is non-descriptive in the sense that it is iconic, where iconicity is analysed in 
terms of three characteristic properties: perspectivalness, significant degree of isomorphism 
between the representation and its object, and analog encoding of information. Second, the 
mode of presentation is non-descriptive in the sense that it is a de re mode of presentation, 
where de re modes of presentation are construed as mental indexicals that determine the 
contextual relation that something must bear to [414] a thought to be the object of the thought 
(Recanati, 1993: 98-103). This gives us the second sense in which we can say that the modes 
of presentation of the content of intentions in action are relational. They are relational insofar 
as they include de re modes of presentation, that is modes of presentation that involve a 
certain relation to the reference.  
Let us now examine what the second sense is in which the modes of presentation of the 
content of intentions in action can be said to be dynamical. Recall that it is an essential 
characteristic of the role of intentions that they be involved in the guiding and monitoring of 
the action as long as it unfolds. How is this essential feature of intentions in action reflected in 
their content? In order for the intention in action to guide the action, it must anticipate the 
consequences of the movements. In order to control it, it must allow for adjustments during 
execution. As a consequence, the content of the intention in action cannot be fully determined 
prior to the initiation of action. To take a very simple example, if my intention in action is to 
take a drink from the glass of water in front of me, its content will include that I reach for the 
glass, that I grasp it and that I lift it. My representation will include estimates as to what the 
trajectory of my arm should be for it to reach the glass, estimates as to how my hand should 
be shaped in order to grasp the glass, estimates as to the amount of force needed to lift it. 
However feedback (be it visual, kinaesthetic, or proprioceptive) will be needed to make 
adjustments. Here the content of the intention is dynamical in the sense both that it gets 
elaborated over time -- it becomes more determinate through feed-back? and that the intention 
in action is itself responsible for the obtention of the information that will make the content 
more determinate. The only way to gain the extra information (the feedback information) is 
for the intention in action to create the context in which the information will be available. 
Perhaps we could say here (if one is not already overdosing on indexicality) that an important 
feature of the content of intentions in action is its dynamical indexicality. Indexicality because 
the exact value of certain constituents of the representation (amount of force that needs to be 
programmed, precise shape of the hand, and so on) can only be fixed relative to a context. 
Dynamical indexicality because the context itself must be brought into existence by the 
intention in action.  
 
6. Are Intentions in Action Causally Self-Referential?  
Let us now go back to the question of the causal self-referentiality of intentions in action. 
Does the characterization just offered of the content of intentions in action and of its mode of 
presentation support Searle's contention that the causal self-referentiality of intentions in 
action is internal to its content? One way to proceed is to try to construct situations where an 
                                                 
11 Here 'perceptual' refers to the sensory information processed in the dorsal pathway as well as to the visual 
information processed by the ventral stream insofar as it influences action and is used for the construction of 
pragmatic representations. 
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agent has an intention in action to A, the agent As, but the agent's Aing does not count as 
satisfying the intention to A and to see what we would say went wrong. Here is a first case. 
Let us say at the outset that this case fails to satisfy the requirements just [415] put forward. 
However, the reasons for the failure are instructive. This case is a free adaptation of an 
example of Searle's. Imagine a man with electrodes on his scalp that record electrical brain 
events that are known to be correlated with the formation of an intention in action. The 
electrodes are connected to a switch which activates a magnet in the ceiling which attracts the 
metal of the watch on his wrist which raises his arm. When the man forms the intention in 
action to raise his arm, the correlated brain activity is recorded by the electrodes, the switch is 
turned on, and his arm rises. Notice that what happens satisfies the content of the intention in 
action of raising one's arm as given by Searle: One's arm goes up as a result of this intention 
in action (1983: 93). Yet we are reluctant to consider this as a bona fide case of a satisfied 
intention in action, and so is Searle. Why? The obvious answer is that the intention in action 
does not cause the action in the right way. Searle's characterization of the conditions of 
satisfaction of the intention in action is incomplete. The content of the intention is not just that 
my arm goes up, it is that my arm goes up as a result of a certain causal process. The form of 
the process is precisely given by the mode of presentation of the bodily movement. So it 
seems that a more adequate characterization of the conditions of satisfaction of the intention 
would be something like: this intention in action causes such and such an internal process that 
results in my arm going up. Obviously, in the present case these conditions are not satisfied, 
the process through which the arm goes up is not the process represented in the content of the 
intention in action. Now one may wonder whether the solution to the problem of the self-
referentiality does not simply lie in the fact that, given the way organisms are built, the kind 
of processes that are represented in intentions in action can only be caused by the intentions in 
action that represent them. If such is the case, it might seem that the explicit mention of the 
causal self-referentiality of the intention among the conditions of satisfaction is redundant, the 
causal self-referentiality is already built in the mode of presentation (the form of a process) of 
the movement. The conditions of satisfaction of my intention to raise my arm would then 
simply be that there is a specific process resulting in my arm going up.  
Although this solution may appear tempting, there is a prima facie counter-example to it. So 
here is a second case: suppose that talking makes me thirsty and that I form the intention in 
action to take a drink from the glass in front of me. As I am about to perform that action, a 
sudden very loud noise in the back of the room startles me, some confusion ensues, and I 
forget completely about my intention. Five minutes later though, when the calm is restored, I 
form a second intention in action to drink and I act accordingly. Is my first intention in action 
thereby satisfied? It seems that if my bodily position and the position of the glass relative to 
me are exactly the same when I form the second intention, then the process of bringing the 
glass to my lips as represented in the second intention in action will be exactly the same as the 
process represented in my first intention in action. Hence, if the condition of [416] satisfaction 
of my intentions in action in both cases is simply that the process obtains, both my intentions 
in action should be said to be satisfied. Intuitively, there is something wrong with that: I acted 
on my second intention in action but I did not act on my first intention in action. So it seems 
that there is more to the causal self-referentiality of intentions than what may be built-in in the 
mode of presentation of the bodily movement. For my first intention in action to be satisfied, 
it is not enough that some token of the same type of intention be satisfied, it is this very token 
that must be satisfied. There is a token-reflexivity of intentions in action that has not yet been 
accounted for. Does this mean that we have to reintroduce in the content of the intention in 
action the explicit causally self-referential component that we thought we could dispense 
with?  
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Maybe not. Maybe the whole intention in action inherits its token-reflexivity from the token-
reflexivity of some other component of the content. What candidates are there? Recall that I 
distinguished earlier between two senses in which the modes of presentation of intentions are 
relational. They are relational in the first sense in that they represent not just states of the body 
or states of the environment, but relations between the two kinds of states. They are relational 
in the second sense in that they include perceptual information about the body and the 
environment, hence constituents whose mode of presentation is de re. For an intention in 
action to be satisfied, it must be the case that these constituents are related to their references 
in a certain way. In particular in the case of perceptual modes of presentation, it must be the 
case that a certain causal-temporal relation obtains between the content of my perceptual state 
and some state of the world. In the case of my first intention in action to drink from the glass, 
this relation does not obtain. The glass being in front of me at 10:05 is not what makes true 
my perception of the glass at 10:00. Hence what happens at 10: 05 cannot be what satisfy my 
first intention in action. So we might want to say that the whole intention in action inherits its 
token-reflexivity from the token-reflexivity of the perceptual components of its content and 
that this is all that is needed.  
But there seems to be a problem with this proposal. After all, when I formed my first intention 
in action to drink from the glass in front of me at 10:00, there was indeed a glass of water in 
front of me. So we may say that my first intention in action was satisfied in part because of 
what was the case at 10:00 (I was related in the right way to the glass of water) and in part 
because of what happened five minutes later. But of course we don't want to say that. This 
suggests that the token-reflexivity of the perceptual constituents of the content of the intention 
in action is not enough to warranty the token-reflexivity of the whole intention and that we 
need something more. But maybe this counter-example to the analysis is only apparent. In 
formulating it we lost sight of the other important feature of the modes of presentation of 
intentions in action: namely that they take the form of a process. The perceptual constituents 
are represented as elements of a process, causally related to other elements. [417] Recall that 
in intentions in action, perceptual information is represented in a specific pragmatic format, in 
a causally indexical way, that leads to the activation of certain motor schemas. Recall also this 
aspect of motor representations that I called their dynamical indexicality : part of the 
perceptual content of the intention in action (the feed-back information) is represented as 
made available by earlier steps in the process. Our purported counter-example fails, because, 
in the situation as described, the conditions of satisfaction of the first intention in action are 
not all satisfied. For the intention to be satisfied it would have to be the case not only that my 
perception of the glass at 10:00 be veridical, but also that it be part of the process resulting in 
my reaching for the glass, grasping it and so on. This second condition does not obtain.  
If these proposals concerning the mode of presentation of the content of intentions in action 
are correct, they provide us with a reductive analysis of the causal self-referentiality of 
intentions in action. To put it bluntly, the causal self-referentiality should be decomposed into 
two parts: the causal part and the self-referential part. The causal part is taken care of by the 
fact that intentions in action represent actions in a certain way, namely as certain processes, 
and only states that represent actions in this way can cause them under those aspects. The self-
referentiality part is taken care of by the fact that the content of intentions in action includes 
perceptual elements that are token-reflexive and that, when successful, anchor the whole 
intention in action to a certain context. The two parts are held together by the fact that the 
token-reflexive constituents of the content are also represented as elements of the process. 
Does this reductive analysis vindicate Searle's contention that causal self-referentiality is 
internal to the content? Yes and no. Yes, since causal self-referentiality appears to be a 
consequence of certain properties of the content of intentions in action. No, if what Searle 
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meant was that causal self-referentiality was a sui generis irreducible component of the 
content of intentions.  
 
7. Awareness of Agency  
Let us now go back to our two problems concerning the relationship between intentions in 
action and prior intentions. What we need to do is to bridge the gap between prior intentions 
and intentions in action. Given the analysis of the relationships between prior intentions and 
intentions in action that was set forth earlier, this means that we must explain both how it is 
possible for an organism to have a conscious grasp of its intentions in action and of their role 
in bringing about actions and how its mastery of action concepts is related to the non-
conceptual content of its intentions in action. Here is where Jeannerod's third and fourth 
theses become relevant.  
His third thesis suggests that there exists a close equivalence between motor preparation and 
motor imagery, conceived as a type of internal imagery, a first-person process pertaining to 
the representation of the self in action, with the subject feeling him- or herself executing a 
given action. Jeannerod's [418] conception of motor imagery is based on an analogy with 
visual imagery. A great deal of data on visual imagery suggest that mental images retain a 
number of the visual and spatial characteristics of visual perception. Jeannerod considers that 
this interpretation of visual imagery could be generalized to mental representations in other 
modalities and, specifically, to motor imagery. As he puts it: 'Motor imagery would 
accordingly be part of a broader phenomenon (the motor representation) related to intending 
and preparing movements' (1994a, p. 189). Jeannerod insists that a clear distinction should be 
drawn between motor imagery and other kinds of imagery including dynamic visual imagery, 
such as mental rotation. In order to delimit his use of the term motor imagery, he appeals to 
the internal and external imagery distinction used by sports psychologists. According to sport 
psychologists (Mahoney and Avener 1987), internal imagery is a first-person process 
involving mostly a kinaesthetic representation of the action, whereas external imagery is a 
third-person process involving a visual representation of that action or of the space in which it 
takes place. Jeannerod conceives of motor imagery as belonging to the former type, i.e. as 
pertaining to the self in action, with the subject feeling himself executing a given action. 
Examples of motor imagery tasks would be imagining oneself walking to a target placed at a 
given distance (Decety et al. 1989), imagining catching a ball, or imagining writing one's 
name. Jeannerod acknowledges, however, that since motor imagery often relates to actions 
taking place within represented visual space, it cannot be entirely segregated from visual 
imagery.  
Three different sources of empirical evidence support Jeannerod's claim of a functional 
equivalence between motor preparation and motor imagery. First, motor imagery has been 
found to have positive effects on motor learning and training (for a review, see Feltz and 
Landers 1983). Second, motor preparation and imagery have been shown to share the same 
neural mechanisms. In particular, the supplementary motor area is activated during both 
imagined and executed movements (Fox et al. 1987). Third, the same physiological correlates 
(increased heart rate and pulmonary ventilation) have been found in both motor imagery and 
preparation (for a review, see Requin et al. 1991).  
According to Jeannerod what distinguishes motor imagery from motor preparation, besides 
the obvious fact that the latter but not the former is followed by actual execution, is that they 
have different subjective contents. Motor preparation is an entirely non-conscious process of 
which only the final result is open to the subject's judgement, whereas, by contrast, the 
content of motor images can be accessed consciously. Jeannerod thinks, however, that this 
difference might be one of degree rather than of kind and suggests that the transition from 
non-conscious to conscious is a matter of timing: a certain amount of time is needed for motor 
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representations to access consciousness. In the case of an actually executed action, the content 
of the motor representation would not reach consciousness because it would be cancelled as 
soon as the corresponding movements were executed (perhaps by the incoming [419] signals 
generated by the execution itself). By contrast, in cases where execution is blocked or delayed 
the representation would be protected from cancellation and would become accessible to 
conscious processing.  
It is important to clarify the status of motor representations and motor images with respect to 
the whole of motor preparation. According to Jeannerod, the representation of the action is 
distributed at several levels of the action system. More precisely, there is a hierarchy of motor 
representations such that the goals and parameters of the actions coded for at the higher levels 
act as constraints on the lower levels of motor representation. One way to think of this motor 
organization is to draw an analogy with visual processing, where the relations between levels 
of motor preparation are the mirror images of the relations between levels of perceptual 
processing. That is, whereas in visual processing the flow of constraints travels mainly in an 
ascending fashion, with the output of lower levels serving as input for higher levels, in motor 
preparation the flow of constraints travels mainly in the opposite direction, with the 
parameters encoded at the higher levels constraining the way processes operate at lower 
levels.  
Another aspect of the analogy with visual processing concerns the accessibility to 
consciousness of the content of representations computed at different levels of processing. In 
the case of vision, only representations computed at higher levels of visual processing seem to 
be accessible to consciousness.12 Thus, according to Jackendoff (1987), the content of the 
conscious visual experience corresponds to the 2 1/2 D sketch in Marr's theory of vision 
(Marr, 1982); by contrast, neither the content of the primal sketch nor the content of the 2D 
sketch are consciously accessible. Since we know much less about motor processing and its 
organization, it would be premature to claim that only representations at such or such level of 
motor processing are consciously accessible. It remains however reasonable to assume that 
aspects of movements that are encoded at higher levels of motor representations will be more 
easily accessed than aspects encoded at lower levels. Hence, the content of motor images will 
presumably correspond to the content of the higher levels of motor representation.  
Let us now consider the first of our two remaining problems. Given that, according to Searle, 
prior intentions are conscious in the sense that we have conscious access to their contents and 
given, moreover, that the content of a prior intention to A (let's say) is that this very intention 
causes an intention in action that in turn causes the bodily movements appropriate to Aing, it 
follows that for it to be possible that an organism form a conscious prior intention, it must be 
able to have a conscious grasp of its intentions in action and [420] of their role in bringing 
about actions. The problem is to explain how this is possible.  
I would like to suggest that a key element to the solution of this problem is Jeannerod's notion 
of a conscious motor image. As we have just seen, according to Jeannerod, the motor image is 
the conscious counterpart of the internal motor representation. More precisely, the content of 
the motor representation (that is normally unconscious) becomes conscious when execution is 
blocked or delayed or when the action fails. Motor intentions, as we have seen, are relational 
models that include both information about the external world -- the objects in the world 
towards which the action is directed and the final state of the environment once the goal is 
attained -- and information about the agent him- or herself as a generator of acting forces. 
Thus, when the unconscious motor intention gets converted into a conscious motor image, the 
subject becomes aware not just of what is being intended (the goal) but of his or her body as a 
                                                 
12 It has been argued by Milner and Goodale (1995) that only activity in the ventral pathway can give rise to 
visual consciousness. They  contend that  'higher-levels' of the dorsal pathway probably can't, their purely 
pragmatic functions proceeding without the need for visual awareness. 
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generator of acting forces. Of course this does not mean that the motor image, by itself, 
provides the agent with a concept of him- or herself as an agent, and with concepts of action, 
but it provides him or her with some form of conscious, though non-conceptual, grasp of his 
or her agency.  
Indeed, the fact -- if it is a fact -- that the motor representation becomes conscious when 
execution is delayed or blocked presents an important advantage. In the normal case (when 
the action succeeds), the motor intention (the cause) is concomitant with the movement (its 
effect). When execution is blocked or delayed, the intention in action is temporally separated 
from its effect. Thus, motor images would give us conscious access to the intention in action 
in its purest form, uncontaminated by feedback linked to execution. It may then be suggested 
that the temporal gap between the intention in action, that gets converted into a conscious 
motor image, and the execution is what allows one to build a notion of oneself as the agent 
responsible for the continuity between intention and action.  
Although Jeannerod stresses that motor preparation is normally unconscious and that 
consciousness of the motor representation is brought about by blocking or delay of the action, 
one should not jump to the conclusion that only failed or delayed actions are experienced as 
actions. Indeed, it does not seem right to say that we only feel responsible for our failed 
attempts! Two points are in order. First, it seems likely that the notion of attention has an 
important role to play here and that blocking or delay may matter only because they draw 
attention to the motor representation and its content. This would allow for the possibility of 
other ways in which attention could be drawn to the action, so that one might voluntarily 
bring to consciousness the content of a motor representation. Yet, blocking and delay may 
retain some form of priority, insofar as, presumably, one cannot voluntarily attend to 
something the existence of which one is totally unaware of. Blocking or delay may thus be 
what makes us aware of the existence of motor representations in the first place.  
[421] Second, it does not feel right either to say that only actions we are attending to in one 
way or another are experienced as our own. It seems that even our successful automatic 
actions are dimly experienced as our own actions. Here, following Wakefield and Dreyfus 
(1991), we may draw a distinction between knowing what we are doing and knowing that we 
are acting. As these authors point out: 'Although at certain times during an action we may not 
know what we are doing, we do always seem to know during an action that we are acting, at 
least in the sense that we experience ourselves as acting rather than as being passively moved 
about' (1991: 268). This distinction between two forms of experience of acting may be 
accounted for in terms of the levels of action-monitoring involved. Several current models of 
action control distinguish between at least two levels of action monitoring (Frith, 1992, 1995; 
Jeannerod, 1997; Wolpert et al., 1995) and recent experimental data suggest the need for 
three-tiered models. According to the two-tiered models, at the lower-level the process of 
action-monitoring is equivalent to the production of an efference copy of a motor command 
for comparison against the reafferent signals generated by the movement. If a mismatch is 
detected, error signals are sent to the motor system for correction, otherwise the system goes 
on to the next step. The mechanisms involved in this comparison process operate at 
subpersonal levels and the representations they operate upon (motor commands, predictions, 
reafferent signals) are normally non-conscious (i. e. we have no conscious access to their 
contents). The higher-level of action-monitoring also involves a comparison, but this time the 
comparison is between the high-level intention of the agent (his conscious representation of 
his goal) and the perceptual representation (mostly visual) of the configuration of the 
environment. This comparison would allow the agent to make a conscious agency judgement 
and to experience the action as his responsibility. Based on this twofold distinction between 
levels of action-monitoring, I would like to make the following tentative proposal. First, 
presumably, one function of the efference-copying and comparator mechanisms involved at 
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the lower-levels of action-monitoring is to allow the nervous system to distinguish between 
the perceptual changes caused by environmental changes and those caused by the execution of 
motor commands. Although these mechanisms operate at subpersonal levels, in the sense that 
the representations they operate on are not consciously accessible, it may be that their 
operation contributes to the awareness an agent has that he is acting rather than being 
passively moved about, where this awareness may not include an awareness of what one is 
doing. Second, it may be that, in most cases, conscious agency judgements involve two 
ingredients: namely, the result of the comparison, made at the high-level of action-monitoring, 
between the intended goal as represented in the intention and the state of the environment, 
together with an awareness that one is or has just been acting.  
Sometimes, though, sole reliance on this information leads agents to over-attribute to 
themselves actions that pertain to another agent. As demonstrated in the Daprati et al. (1998) 
experiment, such over-attributions may arise in [422] contexts where correct agency 
judgements require the agent to know not only that he acted and what he did (what goal was 
achieved), but also how he performed his action. It is known from the literature (Bridgeman, 
Kirch and Sperling, 1981; Goodale, Pélisson and Prablanc, 1986; Jakobson and Goodale, 
1989; Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998) that normal subjects are poorly aware of the 
determinants of their own actions and that, when required to make an agency judgement, they 
tend to privilege movement-related visual information over kinaesthetic information.13 In 
Daprati et al.'s (1998) experiment, subjects -- both normal controls and schizophrenic patients 
--were asked to judge whether what they saw on a TV-screen while performing a simple hand 
movement was their own hand or an alien hand, where they were randomly shown either their 
own gloved hand, or the experimenter's similarly gloved hand performing the same or a 
different movement. In the "easy" conditions, where they saw either their own hand or the 
experimenter's hand performing a different movement, the subjects made correct agency 
judgements. Yet, in the difficult "experimenter-same" trials, the normal subjects misjudged 
the experimenter's hand as theirs in about 30 % of cases, while the error-rate reached 77% in 
the group of schizophrenics with hallucinations, and 50% in the non-hallucinating 
schizophrenics. A possible explanation for this pattern of results is that, in the difficult 
condition, no obvious mismatch was likely to occur between the anticipated and the perceived 
final hand movement. What the subjects had to do in order to make the correct judgement was 
pay attention to slight differences in timing and kinematic pattern between their internal motor 
representations and that perceived by perceptual and kinaesthetic channels. Since these fine-
grained temporal and kinematic aspects of the actions are presumably not encoded in the 
content of high-level intentions, what is needed to succeed at the task is, I suggest, that the 
subjects monitor their actions at a level intermediate between lower-level and high-level 
action monitoring. In other words, they must have access to the contents of at least the higher 
levels of motor representations. At this intermediate level of monitoring, the comparison 
operates not between the high-level intention and the resulting action, but between certain 
aspects of a motor representation and the resulting action. It may be further suggested that 
what is impaired in schizophrenic patients is intermediate action-monitoring, that is a capacity 
to appropriately shift the attentional focus to internal motor representations.  
To sum up, my tentative solution to the problem of explaining how it is possible for an 
organism to have a conscious grasp of its intentions in action and of their role in bringing 
about actions is based on the idea that the normally unconscious motor representations can get 
converted into conscious motor representations when execution is blocked or delayed. The 
motor image provides the organism with an awareness of what is intended and with a 
conscious [423] grasp of his body as a generator of acting forces. Moreover, the existence of a 
                                                 
13 See Jeannerod (1999) for a review and a discussion of these data. 
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temporal gap between intention and action makes it possible to separate out cause and effect 
and allows for a notion of the agent as responsible for the continuity between intention and 
action to be constructed. Two points should bear emphasis. First, although blocking or delay 
are not the only ways in which attention can be drawn to motor representations -- in certain 
circumstances, normal human beings appear able to voluntarily bring to consciousness at least 
part of the content of their motor representations -- they should be granted some form of 
priority, insofar as they may be what makes us aware of the existence of motor 
representations in the first place. Second, I distinguished above three degrees in the 
experience of agency according to the types of action-monitoring involved, namely: an 
awareness that one is acting, an awareness of what one is doing (what one's goal is), an 
awareness of how one is acting. Although a conscious access to the content of one's motor 
representations is not required for the first two forms of awareness to arise, it is crucial to the 
third form of awareness. This third form of awareness is, in turn, a condition of possibility of 
prior intentions, hence of the move from stimulus-driven to deliberate actions.  
 
8. Anchoring Action Concepts  
Let us now turn to our last problem, that is, explaining how the mastery of action concepts is 
related to the non-conceptual content of intentions in action. Recall that I claimed that prior 
intentions have conceptual content whereas intentions in action have non-conceptual content. 
In order to account for the connection between prior intentions and intentions in action, it is 
necessary to explain how a subject can possess action concepts and how, when a prior 
intention causes an intention in action, the conceptual content of the prior intention can be 
converted into the non-conceptual content of an intention in action. One strategy to account 
for the possession of a set of concepts is to claim that possession of this set depends 
asymmetrically on the possession of a set of more basic concepts. However, as remarked by 
Peacocke (1992), since our repertoire of primitive, unstructured concepts is finite, this 
strategy has its limits. There will be at least one set of concepts that does not stand in the 
asymmetrical relation of dependence to any other set. Peacocke claims that relatively 
observational concepts that have peculiarly close links with perception are very plausible 
candidate elements for one such set. Similarly, I contend that, given the close connection 
between prior intentions and intentions in action, there must be a conceptually basic set of 
action concepts.  
Peacocke (1992) distinguishes between two layers of non-conceptual representational content 
that a perceptual experience has: scenario-content and protopropositional content. His notion 
of protopropositional content is of special interest given our purposes. It serves as a basis for 
the anchoring of relatively observational perceptual shape concepts such as square, cubic, 
[424] diamond-shaped or cylindrical, than can be possessed without the subject's awareness 
of any geometrical definition. As described by Peacocke, a protopropositional content 
contains an individual or individuals together with a property or relation (rather than concepts 
thereof) and represents the property or relation as holding of the individual or individuals. To 
put it in a different way, protopropositional content constitutes a layer of perceptual content 
where certain properties or relations of a visual scene are made salient. To borrow one of 
Peacocke's examples, for something to be perceived as square, the symmetry about the 
bisectors of its sides must be perceived, whereas for the same thing to be perceived as 
diamond-shaped, the symmetry about a line that bisects the object's corners must be 
perceived. The difference between perceiving something as a square and perceiving it as a 
regular diamond is a difference between the protopropositional contents of the two 
perceptions. Thus a condition for a thinker to possess the concept square is that she be able to 
have perceptual experiences with a certain type of protopropositional content (concerning the 
straightness of certain lines, the symmetry of the figure about the bisectors of those lines, the 
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identity of certain lengths, etc.) and that she be disposed to form the belief that the 
demonstratively presented object is square when she has an experience with this kind of 
protopropositional content.  
It would certainly be overextending the analogy between perception and action to try to give 
an account of basic action concepts that would run exactly parallel to Peacocke's account of 
observational concepts. In his account, Peacocke stresses the reason-giving relation between 
the having of a perceptual experience with a particular non-conceptual content and a 
judgement that a given concept applies. As the Daprati's et al. (1998) experiment discussed 
earlier illustrates, reason-given relations between motor representations and agency 
judgement can also occur. Yet there is another dimension of the grounding relation that is 
particularly relevant to action concepts. Our action concepts feature as constituents in our 
plans and our prior intentions. Insofar as these can be put to execution -- that is cause 
intentions in action which in turn will cause actions --, it is necessary that the conceptual 
contents of our plans and prior intentions be convertible into the non-conceptual content of 
our intentions in action. For this conversion to be possible, it must be the case that action 
concepts get anchored, directly or indirectly, in non-conceptual content. Basic action concepts 
are those that have particularly close links to motor representations. Hence an important 
condition for an agent to possess a basic action concept is that he be able to form prior 
intentions involving this concept and to carry out these intentions by converting the 
conceptual content of the prior intention into a motor representation with a particular non-
conceptual content. In other words, an account of the possession of basic action concepts also 
involves causal and reason-giving relations that run from prior intentions featuring action 
concepts to motor representations and, ultimately, actions  
[425] Despite this difference in emphasis,14 an important point in Peacocke's account that is 
certainly also relevant for an account of basic action concepts is that we could not be said to 
have mastery of certain concepts unless we were able to have experiences the non-conceptual 
representational content of which made salient certain properties or relations of what is 
experienced. According to the view of basic action concepts I have defended elsewhere 
(Pacherie, 1998), basic action concepts are demonstrative concepts. To have the concept of a 
basic action is to have a concept of acting 'thus', where 'thus' denotes a property made 
accessible to the agent by the motor representations he is able to form. Insofar as the 
demonstrative is used to pick out the properties characteristic of a given type of action and not 
simply to refer to a particular token of an action, the demonstrative 'thus' cannot refer to the 
content of the motor representation taken in all its fine-grained detail. On the contrary it is 
used to select certain aspects of this content, aspects that are shared by this and that action and 
that account for the fact that they fall under the same type.What this means is that in order to 
ground basic action concepts, we need to identify a level of non-conceptual content where 
properties and relations that are essential for the individuation of a type of action are made 
salient. Here again, I think that motor images are good candidates for such a level of content. 
Recall that, according to Jeannerod, motor preparation involves a hierarchy of motor 
representations, with the parameters of the action that are coded for at the higher levels acting 
as constraints on the lower levels of motor representation, and that the content of motor 
images corresponds to the content of the higher-level motor representations. To put it in 
another way, the higher levels of motor representations encode, and thus make salient, the 
goal of the action as well as some relatively global movement parameters, whereas lower-
level motor representations work out the details, so to speak. Thus, if the conscious motor 
                                                 
14 Note that this is indeed only a difference in emphasis. In his account of observational concepts, Peacocke 
(1993: 89) allows that the direction of constitutive explanation runs non only  from experience to concept 
possession but also from concept possession to experience. 
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image gives us access to the content of higher-level motor representations, it indeed provides 
us with a representation of an action where its essential features are highlighted.  
Insofar as our knowledge of the nature and particulars of motor representations and motor 
imagery is much less advanced than our knowledge of their perceptual counterparts, this 
account remains rather speculative. But, if true, it has important consequences for the 
individuation of basic action concepts, namely that mastery of such concepts require that they 
be anchored in the content of motor images, and that a subject should not be granted 
possession of such concepts unless he has motor images. This does not mean that having 
motor images is sufficient for having motor concepts, just as it is not sufficient that a creature 
enjoys perceptual experiences with protopropositional content [426] for it to possess 
perceptual concepts. It is quite possible to conceive of creatures that enjoy experiences with 
structured non-conceptual content of the type described by Peacocke and yet lack the 
cognitive resources needed to construct concepts from that basis. Rather, the idea is that even 
a creature endowed with the cognitive resources needed to construct concepts would fail to 
construct certain concepts if, for some reason or other, it did not have experiences with a 
certain type of structured non-conceptual content.  
There is a serious flaw in the tentative account of the development of action concepts that I 
just sketched. I have neglected an important constraint that all concepts must fulfil, namely 
what Evans (1982) called the Generality Constraint. The Generality Constraint states that for 
a thinker to be said to possess a concept F, it must be possible for him or her to entertain the 
thoughts Fa, Fb, Fc, etc. where a, b, c belong to a range of individuals of which the concept 
can significantly be said to be true or false. It follows from this principle that a subject could 
not be said to possess the concept of an action A, if he were not capable of entertaining the 
thought Aa, with a denoting an individual other than himself. As a consequence, if, as I 
suggested earlier, motor images are to provide the level of non-conceptual content needed for 
the anchoring of basic action concepts, it is indeed essential that we be able to form motor 
images not only of our own actions, but also of the actions of other individuals. But until now 
the only motor images I mentioned were motor images of our own actions. Can me make 
sense of the notion of motor images of the actions of other individuals? Here, we can avail 
ourselves of Jeannerod's fourth claim that similar motor representations underlie the 
preparation and simulation of our own actions and the observation of actions by others. This 
claim is based on neurophysiological evidence first obtained by Rizzolatti and his group 
(Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Di Pellegrino et al., 1992) in their work on macaque monkeys and 
corroborated by a recent series of PET experiments on human subjects. In this last series of 
studies, conditions where subjects were intending actions, preparing for execution, mentally 
simulating actions and observing actions performed by other people were compared (Decety 
et al., 1994, 1997; Grafton et al., 1996, Rizzolatti et al., 1996, Stephan et al., 1995). The 
outcome of these studies is twofold: first, there exists a cortical network common to all 
conditions, to which the inferior parietal lobule, the ventral premotor area and part of the 
SMA contribute; second, motor representations for each individual condition are clearly 
specified by the activation of cortical zones that do not overlap between conditions.  
If indeed conscious access to the content of our motor representations provides the basis for 
an apprehension of ourselves as agents and owners of representations and if the observation of 
an action performed by someone else activates a motor representation similar to the one 
activated during motor preparation for the same action, then similar processes would underlie 
apprehension of oneself and of others as agents. According to this claim, when a subject sees 
someone else acting, she generates a motor representation similar [427] to the one she would 
generate if she were preparing for that action. Since the motor representation is not followed 
by actual execution on her part, it is likely to get converted into a conscious motor image, 
hence the observer is aware of an intention in action. The difference with the case where the 
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subject's own action is blocked or delayed, however, is that, although there is also a gap 
between the intention in action as experienced by the observer and the action, it is of a 
different kind. Although the observer does not perform the action herself, the action is 
actually performed. In such a case, the subject cannot consider herself as responsible for the 
continuity between the experienced intention in action and the action. In order to solve the 
dissonance she experiences, the observer must consider the person or animal observed as 
responsible for the continuity between the intention and the action, and in order to do so the 
observer must ascribe to the person or animal the intention in action that she experiences.  
One last word of caution. Just as I was careful to insist that conscious access to the content of 
our motor representations is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the possession of a 
concept of oneself as an agent and for the possession of action concepts, I should insist here 
that the fact that a motor representation is activated and that a motor image may be formed 
during the observation of others acting is not a sufficient condition for the possession of 
concepts of others as agents or for the possession of action concepts. In both cases, further 
cognitive resources are required and, maybe, as Russell (1996) suggests, the development of 
linguistic competence is needed for concepts of self, others, and action kinds to crystallize. 
What I claim is that motor images of our own actions and of actions performed by others 
provide a basis for the development and application of such concepts.  
 
9. Conclusion  
I have argued that although Searle's distinction between prior intentions and intentions in 
action constituted a progress over earlier versions of the causal theory of action, it also raised 
important new issues. In this paper, I have tried to address some but by no means all of 
them.15 Once a distinction is posited between two types of intentions, one must specify what 
the nature of their respective contents is supposed to be and explain how the two types of 
intentions are connected. I have suggested that in addressing those issues we could [428] 
benefit from the insights provided by recent work in the cognitive neuroscience of action. In 
particular, I have tentatively suggested that neurophysiological work on motor intention could 
help us give a more precise characterization of the content of intentions in action and that 
motor imagery could play a crucial role in bridging the gap between prior intentions and 
intentions in action. 
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